Firstly, of course, Kierkegaard
(translated, his surname means ‘churchyard’, which is interesting in a sort of
random way), is one of those philosophers of the western canon who is very hard
to categorize. There is even an argument as to whether or not he was a
philosopher at all, rather than a theologian, or just a pain old writer of some
interesting stuff. Actually, so far as I know, theologians treat him a bit like
an unexploded bomb, as well. So he is rather a difficult bloke to get a grip
of.
Fortunately, for the purposes of
this post, I do not need to grapple with the complexities of the authorship,
his view of Hegel’s thought and the Danish Golden Age. I do not even have to
deal with Kierkegaard’s actual view of irony and its use in industrial Europe.
But he does have a certain view of the history of irony which I would like to
make use of here.
Effectively, Kierkegaard
criticises Hegel for his view of the history of irony for being too conceptual.
He also praises Hegel for not focussing too much on the particulars of the
history of irony, as Hegel’s predecessors did, at least according to
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s view, thus, is that you need both the particulars,
in this case an understanding of Socrates, Athens of the period when he was
active, the thought of the ancient Greek world, the historical context against
which Socrates spoke, came to trial and was executed, and so on. But you also
need the conceptual, the universal, by which he means an understanding of the
idea of irony which Socrates used.
Kierkegaard’s point against Hegel was that he rushed
too quickly from the particular circumstances of Socrates to the universal
conception of irony, that Hegel did not spend enough effort actually grappling
with ancient Greece and its world of thought before generalising.
Now, this is not the place to
delve into the question of whether Kierkegaard was right or not. Whole tomes
have been written on the subject, even though, as I hinted a little above,
Kierkegaard is regarded as being a bit of an oddball in western philosophy. In
my view (for what little it is worth), Kierkegaard has a lot going for him and
is becoming one of my favourite really annoying philosophers of the moment.
After all, you do not read philosophers with whom you agree, as that is
intellectually flabby. Read the ones with whom you have a beef and explain why
you disagree.
But I digress.
Anyway, these concepts of the
particular and the universal seem to me to have a bearing on the discussion of
probability, emergence and black swan events. All we have in history is a series
of events, more or less well known, more or less well interpreted by our
current historiographical tools. However, as humans and, perhaps, more
specifically, as wargamers, we are conscious that a particular series of events
is contingent, perhaps we might say radically contingent (the word ‘radical’
being very popular nowadays).
So, in Kierkegaard’s terms we
have something that is particular, the stream of events of, say, a battle. We
also know that this stream of events is contingent, in that it could have
happened differently. For example, if Prince Rupert had not retired to his
coach for supper immediately before Parliament attacked at Marston Moor, his
right may not have caved in quite so quickly. We would then have a different
battle, as indeed we would if the pistol ball which wounded Cromwell had been
an inch or so further over.
As wargamers, however, we rely on
abstractions from these contingent events. These are the concepts, the universals
which we include in our rules, which we pepper our history and games with.
Thus, as was pointed out in the discussion, we prefer rules which evolve
modestly, which are not peppered with totally disruptive black swans. And it is
here that the distinction between the universal and particular starts to bite.
We only have the one stream of
history to deal with, the one set of particular events which make up a battle,
a war, a series of wars for which we wish to write a single set of rules. We have
to determine, within that set of particular events, which are the concepts we
are going to use for our rules. Which of the events are reasonable, sensible,
are not going to upset players of the game, and so on.
Some rule sets decide to
incorporate as much of the particular as possible. A battle was lost because
the troops ran out of water? Incorporate it in the rules: troops in hot weather
in dry places suffer such and such a penalty if they are more than x moves from
water. Is this, really, a sensible abstraction to a universal rule of war? I am
unconvinced.
Such examples could be
multiplied, but I will not bother here. You can, I am sure, supply copious
examples of your own, or, perhaps, I have just had a tendency to buy that sort
of rule set. Anyway, in my experience, such particular rules are usually wisely
ignored by the players, and only go to thicken up the rule book, make the rules
more complex (how often, after all, do you need to read ‘-1 if thirsty’?) and show
off the writer’s historical erudition, if not their ability to decide what is
important conceptually.
This is, then, I think the crux
of the matter. Given a single set of events, how can we sensibly decide which
of them are concepts, universals, for inclusion in the rule set, and which are
the oddball, unusual, specific events which need not be covered? And, I suppose,
how do we spot the real black swan ones? My hunch is that the two latter would
be claimed as ‘scenario specific’ items. But how do we tell, really?
I prefer to roll black swan events into the dice without explaining why or even what unlikely event just happened. If the rules tightly control the range of possible results you won't tend to get any while if they rules allow too random a range, they will happen all the time.
ReplyDeletean example, When puttering away on home rules for the "horse and musket" era, one of my test events is the rout of the French Guards by the English Guards at Fontenoy. We have some idea of what happened physically but not really why (eyewitness accounts are contradictory and not clear enugh) as so often the morale impact of the events is in the realm of speculation. It was a rare event in life and one by most rule sets should not happen unless you perhaps you downgrade the French guard to rabble while telling the player they are the best troops in his army or by introducing a special scenario rule.
Attempts to have it possible but not likely have been a real challenge for me however, there is a venerable old rule set from the 60's, "Charge!", that does it organically and simply. Infantry roll a 6 sided die for each 8 figures with the score indicating the number of 'hits' 2 full regiments facing each other at close range in the ooen, as was the case at Fontenoy, will on average inflict around 21 casualties on each other but it could be as low as 6 which will have negligible effect or as high as 36 which would rout the enemy. (or anywhere inbetween). I'll leave it to a statistician to work out the odds of rolling a total of greater than 30 on 6 dice especially at the same time that the enemy rolls really low. Suffice it to say that it doesn't happen often but the possibility looms in your mind every time you trade fire at close range.
The fly in some people's ointment is that there is no explanation of why the result occurred ( a bit like real life), little player control (other than not standing in the open and not attacking) and under the rules, in an historical refight, it could just as well be the British Guards which are shattered (the historically expected result).
Looking at the broad picture over centuries of warfare it does reflect the old military saying "s*it happens".
I suppose that some of the problems arise from something of a lack of finesse in our normal dice rolls. Real life has many more than six or thirty-six possible outcomes. throwing more and more dice will tend to average out, but can also, as you note, throw up the occasional outlying result.
DeleteIt seems to me that there are various parties lying behind the 'explanation' and 'ignorance' camp. Some seem to want complete control of the battlefield (c.f. Chris' comments on Taylor's rules the other week) and some will accept more easily the 'wild card' outcomes. I guess that this is simply a case of an individual outlook or preferance.