As you probably recall, I suggested that a wargame, in terms
of what the participants are doing, was a trial of conflicting narrative with
mutually exclusive goals. That is, if I am playing a wargame against you, my
goal is that I win the game, and your goal is that you win it. It is very hard
to find situations where both of these outcomes obtain. Some scenario games may
approach it, as may some campaign games, but in most wargames there are winners
and losers, or, alternatively, a draw where neither outcomes have been
delivered.
It occurred to me that this might give another angle on the
issue of wargame ethics, or why we play some things and not others. The
evidence so far that I have found, or people have commented about, or I have
seen as games suggest that there are few wargame eras, even up to the fracas in
Afghanistan, which you will not find someone, somewhere, playing and producing
figures and rules for.
Similarly (or perhaps, oppositely), there are a good number
of people who will not play certain games, or eras or particular sides – the Germans
in World War Two is one such example. The have an ethical theory which will
cover both of these camps has turned out to be a bit tricky, to say the least.
None of the three main meta-ethical theories, virtue ethics, utilitarianism and
deontological, have proved to give us a particularly good handle on the ethics
of given historical wargames. As meta-ethical theories they cannot, in a
general sense, take account of individual tastes and viewpoint anyway.
The idea of a wargame being formed of conflicting narratives
does, however, give us a potential way in. As human beings we form ourselves,
at least to a large extent, by the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves,
and those which we tell others. This is obviously trivial to some people, while
others need some convincing. However, we do like to tell stories, and many of
the stories are about ourselves, our values, our activities. As a minor
example, ‘how was your day’ requires some sort of story in reply, if the
question is not just to be dismissed as phatic speech.
The stories we tell ourselves, and tell of ourselves, arise
from the sets of values and processes which are imposed upon us by our culture,
society, education and personal life history. Again, this is reasonably obvious
in some senses. If I have lost a leg in an industrial accident, that is going
to inform my life story. If, like Roosevelt, I am disabled by childhood polio,
that too will inform my life story, even if I spend a lot of my time hiding the
fact of my disability from the general population.
Similarly, our society and culture can impact significantly
on our stories. For example, the question ‘did you vote?’ is a fairly neutral
one in most western liberal democracies, where voting is a right but not a
requirement. In an oppressive one party
state where a 100% turn out and vote for the party is expected, however, the
question takes on much nastier overtones, and our own personal responses to it
have a much greater impact, potentially, on our life stories.
How then do our own narratives of our lives in general
impact upon our wargaming choices and hence, on our wargaming ethics?
Wargaming (believe it or not) is not the whole of life, and
nor is it separated from the rest of our lives. Therefore, the wargaming
narratives that we tell can impact on the stories we tell more generally. If,
as I have suggested, our narratives of our lives represent to ourselves and to
the world ourselves, our virtues and vices, our outlooks and choices, then our
wargaming stories are going to represent something of those factors. Our
wargaming stories will impact on the rest of our lives, and we have to justify
them, at least to ourselves, somehow.
The give an example, suppose you have just been having a
wargame where the two sides are Russian partisans in World War Two and one of
those nasty SS rear area units whose job was to keep the partisans down. You
return home having won the game. ‘How did it go?’ asks your nearest and
dearest. ‘I won,’ you reply, ‘I shot thirty unarmed and surrendered partisans,
plundered and burnt the village and raped and murdered the women after killing
their children in front of them. Great game.’
You nearest and dearest may well, at this point, be reaching
for the phone to call an ambulance to take you to a psychiatric hospital. The
above scenario is not one that most of us want within our narratives. It is at
odds with most right thinking people’s views and, as such, we do not even wish
it to be included in a fictional part of our lives. It has no place in the
narratives of decent western liberal people.
The reasons why this sort of (even fictional) behaviour is
excluded from our narratives is an interesting and rather complex one. Clearly,
given that the sorts of events outlines above did happen and are a matter of
historical record means that that sort of behaviour is not outside the limits
of the possible. But we temper the possible by the sorts of things we wish to
represent to ourselves in our narratives, of which our wargaming activities are
a part.
This sort of approach dates back to Aristotle, of course. He
argued that the sorts of things that we do become habitual, and they can be
habitually virtuous or habitually vicious. If, then, we habitually cultivate
vicious behaviour, even at the level of the (imaginary) game described above,
Aristotle argues that we will, ourselves, become more vicious, and if we act
more virtuously, we will become more virtuous.
Therefore, I suggest that the wagames we feel uncomfortable
with are those where we undertake behaviour that we would not feel comfortable
with in the narratives of our whole lives. And that, it seems to me, is an
issue which is, in the final analysis, a personal one.