Richelieu and Olivares

I have been slowly picking up on my wargame-related reading, after my sojourns in Simone Weil and Reality, and finally got back to this slim volume:

Elliott, J. H., Richelieu and Olivares, Cambridge, CUP, 1984.

This is another work I remember from being impoverished, and I concluded that there was never a chance that I should read it. However, umpteen years later, the advent of the internet and second-hand bookshops thereon, selling off ex-library books on the cheap, means that I have obtained a copy. And worth reading it was.

Now, I am no expert of France and Spain in the 1620s and 1630s, which is when both gentlemen were at the height of their powers. From a wargamer’s point of view, however, the interest is more in the 1630s with the cold war for Italy, including the Mantuan Wars, and then the start of the war between the two countries in 1635. There is, of course, a lot more to it than that.

The historian's interest is, of course, somewhat different. Richelieu and Olivares were the chief ministers of Louis XIII and Philip IV respectively, and both had their problems in staying in power. Richelieu was regarded with hostility by a group of courtiers around the Queen Mother, called the dévots. This group believed that France’s foreign policy should be aligned with Catholic Europe against the Protestants. Richelieu, of course, famously allied France with the Dutch and the Swedes against the Empire. This led to such excitements as the Day of Dupes, in which Richelieu nearly lost power, but emerged triumphant.

Part of the reasoning behind Richelieu’s foreign policy was the fear of being surrounded by Spanish and Hapsburg territories. Olivares, it would seem, had no such concept, but was trying to gain Spain a sort of peace with honour, at least with the Dutch. He believed that this was only achievable by close cooperation with the Hapsburg Emperor, who should support Spain’s war with the Dutch. While Ferdinand was quite happy to cooperate with the Spanish in the events that led to Nordlingen (1634) he was a bit less keen to invade the Low Countries. All the powers, after all, had their own internal problems to deal with.

Richelieu dealt with the major problem within France’s borders, the semi-independent Protestant Huguenot, in 1628 at the siege of La Rochelle. This included the attempted intervention of both an English fleet and a Spanish one. The English failed, which led to the assassination of the Duke of Buckingham. The Spanish arrived too late. This was more or less the tone of Olivares’ time in power; the Spanish were always scraping around for resources of men and money to defend the Empire from assorted enemies. There was never enough, and this led, indirectly, to Olivares’ downfall. From the 1620s he had pushed for a union of arms across the Empire, including all the semi-autonomous regions of it – Naples, Catalonia, the Americas, Portugal as well as Castile. As it was, the main burden fell on Castile which was becoming bankrupt and depopulated. However, the result was that Portugal, Catalonia, and Naples all rebelled causing even more problems and leading to the retirement of Olivares himself.

Richelieu, after 1630, was probably more secure in the confidence of the King, although neither man could count themselves as wholly safe in power. On the other hand, the great lords of France had a tradition of rebellion and revolt, rather than loyal service to the crown, which was a problem that Olivares did not have. Thus the King’s brother and mother were, and remained a problem, whether living in France apparently reconciled to the King, or in exile hostile to Richelieu. Given that Olivares was interested in causing dissent in France, of course, they offered a cheap way of attempting to undermine Richelieu. The fact that the conspirators were not actually that good at conspiracy (or that Richelieu was very good at blocking them) to some extent did not matter. The Cardinal had to spend a fair bit of time and energy watching them and nipping any dissent in the bud. This also led to some summary trials and executions, which led to Richelieu’s reputation as a tyrant.

Both men would, in fact, have preferred to spend their time on internal reform. Both kingdoms were hotchpotches of semi-autonomous regions, directly controlled crown lands and various jurisdictions. Both regimes needed money, and that only came from taxes – ultimately at least: loans had to be repaid sometime. Both countries needed to increase trade and industry while breaking down internal barriers. Some efforts were made in these directions but any reform became impossible with the advent of warfare between them.

Richelieu is often regarded as the winner of the contest. This is perhaps a little unfair on Olivares, who played a perhaps weaker hand with skill and determination. As Elliott points out, after Richelieu died, France was convulsed by unrest which led to the Fronde. He did not leave a well-ordered, obedient, and quiet country, but one seething under the burden of war taxation. The weak government, albeit under Mazarin, was open to noble revolt and the nobles duly revolted.

Spain, of course, suffered more revolts and the Empire partially collapsed. Catalonia and Naples were restored to it, but Portugal was lost. While Elliott does not go into it, the loss of Portugal was a strategic decision by the Spanish high command – Catalonia and Naples were deemed to be more important, so the Spanish did not really give any attention to Portugal until 1660.

The results of the comparison could probably be described as a score draw, which is more the most historiography ascribes to Olivares and less than it give Richelieu. The real interest of the book, however, is in the career parallels of Olivares and Richelieu. The latter gets the kudos for making France great again, and the former gets opprobrium for the dissolution of the Spanish Empire. Neither judgement is above criticism, however. History is, after all, contingent.