Lightest Africa Again

In the chapter on conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Seventeenth Century, Jeremy Black observes that there were three types of conflict. The first was between African states themselves, the second between European actors and native Africans, and the third between Europeans (The Cambridge Illustrated Atlas of Warfare: Renaissance to Revolution, p. 42). The dynamic powers, he observes, were African. Colonialism had not really got started by 1600.

The planned expansion of the 1600 – Something campaign to Africa has reached the South-West of the continent. The activity here was mainly Portuguese. The margin by which European technology – muskets – outclassed native weaponry was not great. The Musketeers were hampered by a slow rate of fire, and I read somewhere that the Africans learnt to throw themselves flat as the firearms were discharged, scrambling up and charging before the Europeans could reload.

For my pains I have been reading John K. Thornton’s The Art of War in Angola, 1575-1680 (Comparative Studies in Society and History, 30(2), 360–378, (1988).) As with much modern military history, it is of perhaps limited use to the wargamer. In a similar way, I am afraid, Thornton’s book on warfare in Atlantic Africa was only of limited use. There are reasons for this which I have discussed elsewhere (p. 168 – 170 of that book), so I will not repeat myself here. But there are some interesting takeaways, at least for my purposes.

Firstly, there were no cavalry available in central Africa. The climate is just not suitable for them, and even though the Portuguese tried to introduce them, they never got above about a dozen mounted men. These might have been useful for scouting, but could get overwhelmed by the scouts of the other side. So, in general, cavalry were not used.

Secondly, at least for Angola, the DBR army lists seem to be in error. Thornton argues that the normal Portuguese army in Angola consisted of European officers and generals, and mostly African troops. The DBR list (III.1) lists 10 – 48 Portuguese foot, and 6 – 12 Africa slave or Arab infantry. This seems to be incorrect, although the West African Forest Peoples list (III.7) does allow Portuguese allies. This is probably more accurate for ‘Portuguese’ armies.

A consequence of the lack of horses was, of course, that the pack animals became humans. Given that the land was fairly sparsely occupied, armies had limited opportunities to forage, and so had to carry more or less everything they needed, in terms of food, with them. Hence armies had large quantities of porters and camp followers. Thornton suggests a rule of thumb should be one and a half camp followers per soldier. This limited the maximum size of armies to 10 – 15,000, although these were regarded as handy armies in Europe at the time, I believe.

The impact of the musket was limited. As noted above, the slow rate of fire was a problem. So, too, was the habit of Angolans to fight in fairly dispersed formations. They did use arrows, but saw no need to close up as European armies did. The latter fought in close order units, of course, because they did have to face cavalry. The Angolans, not having this problem, fought in a much more open formation. Thornton notes, along the way, that opponents tend to overestimate the size of armies which are dispersed. The units, after all, fill more space per man than expected.

The Angolans did not use much in the way of fortification. After all, if your opponent was going to starve in a few days anyway, you only had to delay him for that length of time, and they would be forced to go away. Thornton notes that the local defences resembled the earthworks, ditches, and low walls that Europeans had developed painfully from the later Fifteenth Century. Given the logistical and manpower limitations, and the infrequency of fortifications, artillery was not widely used.

The Portuguese, it seems, largely adapted themselves to Angolan styles of warfare, rather than the other way around. The Portuguese infantry did have some advantages in weaponry, swords and armour, although it made them rather slower than their opponents. The Angolans too had heavier infantry, and used them as a reserve, which could win or lose the battle. The Portuguese adopted similar tactics. These reserves were used when the lighter infantry ran away, which they often did. After all, the threat of pursuit was much less in a cavalry-free battle environment, and so breaking formations (especially when they were looser already) had a much lower penalty than it did in Europe.

This ability to run away also made the baggage train more important, incidentally. The protection and capture of baggage was an important consideration on the battlefield. After all, many of the troops’ families could be found there, and so it was an important morale consideration, if nothing else. On the other hand, given the propensity to run away, decisive victories were hard to obtain, as the defeated army would simply reform a few days later and menace the victors.

Overall, I think Angolan forces will fit quite well into the campaign. The Portuguese tried for decades to subdue them, largely unsuccessfully. Conquest had to wait until the Nineteenth Century. In fact, the Portuguese conformed largely to local tactics and conditions, and used African troops extensively. One force in 1585 consisted of 300 Portuguese and 9000 Africans. The parallels to the Spanish conquest of Mexico are few. The Portuguese did not have the same technological edge as the Conquistadores, nor did they arrive at a critical time in the politics of the regions as the Spanish did.

African polities were quite capable, in the time period of interest, of resisting, allying with and using European forces and arms. The Portuguese were not always successful against African forces, and the situations on the ground were often complex, with assorted native polities, mutually hostile, who were quite capable of manipulating the situation to their advantage. In this sense, of course, the parallels with Central America are more distinct. As there, we have to let the native have their agency.