When In (or Near) Rome

 The Machiavelli 1499 campaign has now got to the Summer of 1503, and with this, the confrontation between the Neapolitan Spanish and Papal States has got, well, even more significant. The manoeuvres of the various sides have been halting, of course (that is by design) but the Spanish have managed to move a second army to the Papal States to reinforce the one which had a defensive victory over the Papal armies last time out. Given the defeat, the latter experienced last time the Papal armies are now outnumbered and isolated while attempting to defend Rome.

In other news, the war between the Vatican and Venice proceeds, with the Venetians doing a city grab on Ancona, much to the Pope’s irritation and strategic problematicalness, while a Papal army has gone walkabout in the north and is besieging Trent.

As Papal general, I had a problem, in that the loss of Ancona, coupled with the likely loss of Rome would mean that only one home city, Bologna, would remain between me and being knocked out of the campaign. As it is, the loss of Rome would mean the loss of an army in the next winter turn, as the Florentines have nicked Piombino as well.

With some trepidation, then, the Papal army stood on the defensive against the combined might of the Spanish armies, or at least one and a half Spanish armies. Fortunately, I rolled up a nice defensive position, so it was not a wholly unviable situation.

The Papal army is to the left in the picture, the infantry deployed on a hill. The left-wing cavalry is also on a hill, while the right is in a meadow by the stream. The river is mostly unfordable (except by the ford), unless a six is rolled. The Spanish have deployed their light cavalry looking for a second ford, while their skirmishing crossbow foot is aiming to cross the marsh. The Spanish lights will converge on the known ford and attempt to cross there, followed by the heavy cavalry and arquebusiers.

As Papal commander, I was acutely aware of the strategic situation and wanted to fight really defensively. The aim was to keep the army intact, and hopefully defend Rome, but I would need to troops to retake Ancona in due course, with the help of the navy.

In the picture above the blue triangles indicate the location of the fords. One was next to the existing ford, which did not really affect the situation as it was already covered by the mounted crossbowmen and right-wing gendarmes. The jinites, however, were forcing the other ford and that was a problem because they were followed by the Spanish gendarmes.

A whirling cavalry fight on the Papal left ensued. The jinites skirmished the Papal heavies and nearly held them off long enough for the Spanish gendarmes to recover their order after crossing the ford. The Papal advance routed one base of jinites but at some cost to their own order, and were counter-charged by the Spanish, uphill. The Spanish gendarmes refused to charge, however, but their general was present and led them into the Papal forces, whom they overcame. This was by dint of numbers and having jinites available to flank the Papal cavalry.

The Spanish did not have it all their own way, and it took a few moves to rout the Papal left and the Spanish heavy cavalry were dispersed over the hill. However, that was enough to convince me, as Papal commander, that the time had come to abandon Rome and make for Ancona.

My strategic reasoning was given above. Tactically the loss of the left wing gave a major problem. Although the situation at the main ford was blocked, keeping it so required the gendarmes of the right wing. Anything less and the Spanish would be across. The transfer of the gendarmes to cover the left would also take time which, even though the Spanish right would need time to recover, I probably did not have. Furthermore, the mounted crossbowmen were coming under fire from the jinites of the Spanish right and the Spanish were also directing their crossbowmen to the ford on their right.

If the Spanish had crossed the ford in force, then my infantry on the hill would have been in danger of being surrounded, outshot, and threatened by gendarmes. And that would be before the Spanish arquebusiers had got into the action at the main ford.

On the whole then, both the tactical and the strategic situation suggested that retreating and abandoning Rome would be the best idea. The Papal army disengaged and moved back to Spoleto. If they get another initiative card in the autumn they might yet save Ancona. Anything else and Ancona will remain controlled by Venice and the Papacy will have to lose an army in the winter. I am now regretting the city grab that the Papal fleet indulged in in siezing Dalmatia. This opened Ancona to the Venetian fleet, which they took advantage. Sometimes city grabs are counter-productinve.

This was very interesting as an example of the interaction of the strategic and the tactical. If the Papal army had managed to stave off the Spanish then Rome would have been saved, but after the left was defeated that was really no longer a possibility. I could have fought on, but in all probability the Papal army would have been defeated on the battlefield and eliminated, leaving no chance of recapturing Ancona, as opposed to the present little chance.

There may well be a lesson involved in this. The tactical does not always dictate the outcomes of battles. There is often a higher level, even in a very simple strategic game like Machiavelli. The Papal States simply cannot afford to lose another army, especially in battle, unless I am reading the situation wrongly. Even if they do not retake Ancona this year, they can lose the army in Trent without seriously damaging their strategic situation, at least on the assumption that the Spanish will track south to tackle the French in southern Italy, rather than chase them across through Spoleto. We shall see.