tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post3078839075421167202..comments2024-03-24T04:20:44.650-07:00Comments on Polemarch: Critical PointsThe Polemarchhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10958736917525649927noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-66455947315450130952015-11-21T02:02:13.400-08:002015-11-21T02:02:13.400-08:00I suppose this is not incompatible with the model ...I suppose this is not incompatible with the model of most soldiers trying to stay alive and a few heroes and junior officers trying to get noticed. someone might, when necessary, step up; I suppose if no-one does, the unit disintegrates. <br /><br />It could also be a case of knowing what to do as well, and being believed. A new recruit shouting 'Sarge is dead, follow me, men' would likely be ignored. I suppose it would depend on how convincing they were.The Polemarchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10958736917525649927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-19508365360640676472015-11-14T07:12:01.000-08:002015-11-14T07:12:01.000-08:00Young was most famous ad a commando of course whil...Young was most famous ad a commando of course while Lawford was in the Indian army, bith in wwii. I suspect the big difference is between experienced professionals vs conscripts/levies vs volunteers and between raw volunteers and experienced ones. The greater the experience the less need of example and the greater ability to step up. Going back 200 years one hears of corporals taking charge when no officers or sergeants were left and both Caesar and Xenephon give example of men stepping forward to take charge when needed. Obviously not every man, esp not the ones running away, but more likely amongst expetiencdd pros.Ross Mac rmacfa@gmail.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04053555991679802013noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-78440528695695619272015-11-10T02:59:22.331-08:002015-11-10T02:59:22.331-08:00Ah, yes, simple and straightforward, and effective...Ah, yes, simple and straightforward, and effective, I should think. <br /><br />I suppose the debate is between command and casualties, with the latter winning. Given the rate of junior officer casualties in WW1, it might not be such a bad way of looking at things. I wonder if it works for earlier eras, though.The Polemarchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10958736917525649927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-55261402025938540852015-11-09T02:35:08.291-08:002015-11-09T02:35:08.291-08:00yes, a mounted colonel worth 2 pts and 4 foot off...yes, a mounted colonel worth 2 pts and 4 foot officers worth 1.There was a mechanism for random assignment of hits plus a rule for sharpshooters trying to pick off officers. The pt value of lost officers was subtracted from morale roles. Intetestingly, the contemporary Charge! rules written by 2 officers with combat experience as well as being historians, had a mechanism for randomn assessment of casualties but no negative effect from losing them!Ross Mac rmacfa@gmail.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04053555991679802013noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-13907608499495066862015-11-09T01:12:38.911-08:002015-11-09T01:12:38.911-08:00I guess most rule writers know about these sorts o...I guess most rule writers know about these sorts of things, it is just a question of which bits they model, and which bits of them are focussed upon. <br /><br />We run models for 'grinding down' and deal with that in one way, and then we add a model for some sort of crisis simulation. The two can interact, but one tends to dominate. In DBA it is the crisis. In other rules it is the grinding. We probably need both, but it is hard to get them really working together. <br /><br />And, of course, attacking your opponent's morale (wiping out that lovingly painted guards unit he's just finished) is much more effective, except in solo wargames, of course.The Polemarchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10958736917525649927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-52184421251490968722015-11-09T01:08:48.429-08:002015-11-09T01:08:48.429-08:00Yes, fair point, I think. Within a base the comman...Yes, fair point, I think. Within a base the command structure is abstracted away, so it cannot be included. I seem to remember that Grant's rules had specific options for picking off officers, and some impact on morale from there. Can anyone confirm my memory?The Polemarchhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10958736917525649927noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-5882980295243387632015-11-07T10:15:44.664-08:002015-11-07T10:15:44.664-08:00Isn't the issue not just one of numbers of men...Isn't the issue not just one of numbers of men left and the effect on morale but also a question of having to abstract who actually gets killed? A loss of a key commander or an influential NCO would have an impact far greater on the battlefield than the loss of 10 inexperienced riflemen out of a company of men.<br /><br />The ability of a unit to keep fighting in the face of casualties, is to me, a reflection of how many men can step up to take positions of command rather than sheer numbers of the morale of the troops.<br /><br />Cheers,<br /><br />Pete.Pete.https://www.blogger.com/profile/06668389518826053090noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5185876513552272723.post-28981770160737010542015-11-07T04:01:00.525-08:002015-11-07T04:01:00.525-08:00My short comment is "yes".
In many way...My short comment is "yes". <br /><br />In many ways these are 2 separate but related things, actually more than 2 but lets cap it at 3. Lets call it the physical state, the cohesion state and outside stress. <br /><br />Starting with the physical, marching and fighting in full kit is tiring, negative emotions tend to make people feel the effects more while enthusiasm and adrenaline rushes can temporarily mask them. In addition combat depletes and degrades weapon capability, bullets, arrows and spears run short etc. A fully armed soldier will tend to feel braver than one who lacks the means to defend himself.<br /><br />Morale tends to be closrly tied to discipline and leadership. Average individuals tend to be happier hiding behind rocks, maybe taking occassional potshots when no one is looking. When a unit is taking casualties that co bination of "team spirit" and leadership can overcome natural fear but inevitably some of those losses will be amongst the official and unofficial leaders and will undermine the crucial cohesion. Experience and expectations affect this, both victory and defeat can become habits.<br /><br />Thats when the moments of crisis are most dangerous.<br /><br />In wargames, from a simulation pov there would some merit in having a 3rd party tracking all this and including it in calculations while just informing players of what they can see from where they are or are told by mesengers. In a game though many of us like to be in on the story as it develops. <br /><br />Reading various old wargaming authors I get the impression that some at least understood all of this and used the casualty removal and 50% rule as shorthand to get the right effect combined with a theatric air that would affect the gamer's own morale as he removed figures. <br /><br />My understanding of some systems such as dba where there is no visible or measurable degradation is that it is assumed to be taking place but the gamer can't tell or measure it except when the unit ceases to function thus giving the effect of the simulation but without the logical arrival at the decision. Ross Mac rmacfa@gmail.comhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04053555991679802013noreply@blogger.com